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BREXIT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: DISENTANGLING
LEGAL ORDERS
Jed Odermatt ∗
INTRODUCTION
On March 29, 2017, British Prime Minister Theresa May gave notice under
Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) of the United
Kingdoms’ intention to leave the European Union. 1 This notification came
after the British Parliament passed the European Union (Notification of
Withdrawal) Act (2017) 2 earlier in the month, giving the Prime Minister the
power to give formal notice to the Council of the European Union. 3 Such
formal notice intends to give effect to the result of the 2016 referendum in
which 51.9% of voters voted in favor of leaving the Union. 4 While this is a
historic moment for the UK and the EU, the invocation of Article 50 TEU is
only the start of a long and complicated negotiation process between the UK
government and the EU.
Since the Brexit referendum, there has been intense debate about what kind
of relationship the United Kingdom will have with the EU upon its withdrawal.
On January 17, 2017, Prime Minister May outlined in broad strokes what such
a relationship might look like, 5 and on February 2, 2017, the Government
published a White Paper that provided some more detail about the UK’s
∗ Postdoctoral Research Fellow, University of Copenhagen, Centre of Excellence for International
Courts (iCourts). Jed.Odermatt@jur.ku.dk. The author would like to thank Dr. Tim Corthaut and Dr. Graham
Butler for their comments on previous drafts.
1 Letter from Theresa May, Prime Minister of the U.K., to Donald Tusk, President of the Eur. Council
(Mar. 29, 2017), http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/XT-20001-2017-INIT/en/pdf [hereinafter
Letter to the European Council]; Anushka Asthana, Heather Stewart & Peter Walker, May Triggers Article 50
With Warning of Consequence for UK, GUARDIAN (Mar. 29, 2017, 10:13 A.M.), https://www.theguardian.
com/politics/2017/mar/29/theresa-may-triggers-article-50-with-warning-of-consequences-for-uk.
2 European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act, (2017) http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2017/
9/pdfs/ukpga_20170009_en.pdf (the Act is only available in online format at the time of this writing).
3 SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, EUROPEAN UNION (NOTIFICATION OF WITHDRAWAL)
BILL, REPORT, 2016-17, HL 119, ¶ 2 (UK).
4 Results, BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.com/news/politics/eu_referendum/results (last visited Apr. 1,
2017).
5 Theresa May, Prime Minister of the U.K., PM Speech: The Government's Negotiating Objectives for
Exiting the EU (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-governments-negotiatingobjectives-for-exiting-the-eu-pm-speech.
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position. 6 The White Paper sets out twelve principles that will guide the
process—such as “Taking control of our own laws” and “Providing certainty
and clarity” 7—which put forth the Government’s priorities, but provide very
little in terms of substance.
The UK further elaborated on its position in the letter addressed to the
President of the European Council, which gave notification under Article 50
TEU. 8 The UK set out a number of “principles” that would guide the future
negotiations. These include: respectful and constructive engagement; putting
citizens first; working towards a comprehensive “deep and special partnership
agreement”; minimizing disruption and giving as much certainty as possible
for citizens, businesses, and investors; paying attention to the UK’s unique
relationship with Ireland; and working together “to advance and protect . . .
shared European values.” 9 Importantly, the UK set out its aim of reaching a
comprehensive agreement on economic and security issues within the two-year
period for exit talks.
There are two main takeaways from the UK position so far. First, Prime
Minister May underlined the position that “no deal for Britain is better than a
bad deal for Britain,” 10 meaning that the UK is willing to walk away from a
deal that is punitive or seen to be not in its interests. Second, the Prime
Minister stressed that the UK will not leave the EU only to then enter into a
similar type of relationship in another form. 11
On March 31, 2017, the European Council also set out its “Draft
Guidelines” for negotiations, which include a list of certain “core principles.” 12
These guidelines set out that there should be a “phased approach” to
negotiations, stressing that “an agreement on a future relationship between the
Union and the United Kingdom as such can only be concluded once the United

6 HM GOVERNMENT, THE UNITED KINGDOM’S EXIT FROM AND NEW PARTNERSHIP WITH THE EUROPEAN
UNION, 2017, Cm. 9417 (UK), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
589189/The_United_Kingdoms_exit_from_and_partnership_with_the_EU_Print.pdf.
7 Id. at 5.
8 Letter to the European Council, supra note 1.
9 Id. at 4–5.
10 Theresa May, supra note 5.
11 Id.
12 European Council Note, XT 21001, Draft guidelines following the United Kingdom's notification
under Article 50 TEU (Mar. 31, 2017) [hereinafter European Council Draft Guidelines]. See In full: The EU's
Draft Guidelines for Brexit Negotiations, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 31, 2017), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/
03/31/full-eus-draft-guidelines-brexit-negotiations/.
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Kingdom has become a third country.” 13 Both the UK’s principles and the
European Council’s Draft Guidelines should be viewed as opening positions
on how negotiations should proceed. We are not much closer to knowing
exactly what a post-Brexit relationship will look like.
The final deal between the EU and the United Kingdom will be shaped by
power and interests, not by the strict application of legal rules. Article 50 TEU
sets out the process of withdrawal, but says nothing about the most complex
questions facing the Union and the withdrawing Member State. 14 This does not
mean, however, that law will not play a central role. One noticeable aspect of
the public debate since the Brexit referendum is how frequently parties have
framed their arguments in legal terms. The UK Government, EU officials,
leaders of EU Member States, as well as the media and academics often
discuss Brexit in terms of what is legally permissible. For example, the debate
on issues such as whether the UK could have full access to the single market
without accepting the freedom of movement, 15 or whether the UK could start
negotiating trade deals with third countries before it leaves, 16 are not about
what is desirable, but about what the law permits. While bargaining power and
interests will shape the Brexit process, these are funneled through legal
arguments and debates. The role of the law in the Brexit process can already be
seen, for example, in the litigation in the UK over whether the Government
could trigger Article 50 TEU through the exercise of its prerogative powers. 17

13

European Council Draft Guidelines, supra note 12, at para. 4.
See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 50, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326)
13 [hereinafter TEU].
15 See, e.g., Sunder Katwala, Brexit Britain Can Balance Immigration and Single Market Access, FIN.
TIMES (Oct. 31, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/d9a7163e-9129-11e6-a72e-b428cb934b78; Merkel: No
British Access to Single Market Without Free Movement, REUTERS (Oct. 15, 2016), http://www.newsweek.
com/no-british-access-single-market-without-free-movement-510317.
16 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 216(2), May 9,
2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]. See, e.g., Andrés Delgado Casteleiro, Taking Back Control
Over Trade Policy: Art 50 TEU and the Repatriation of Trade Powers, DELI BLOG (July 6, 2016),
https://delilawblog.wordpress.com/2016/07/06/andres-delgado-casteleiro-taking-back-control-over-tradepolicy-art-50-teu-and-the-repatriation-of-trade-powers/ (“Can the UK negotiate international trade agreements
once article 50 TEU has been triggered? The short answer is no.”); Adam Payne, EU Leaders: ‘It’s Absolutely
Clear’ UK Cannot Negotiate Trade Deals with Other Countries Until After Brexit, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 23,
2017),
http://www.businessinsider.com/eu-warns-theresa-may-about-post-brexit-trade-deal-with-trump-usa2017-1?r=UK&IR=T; Francis Hoar, The United Kingdom’s Right to Negotiate Free Trade Agreements Before
Leaving the European Union, LAWYERS FOR BRITAIN (Oct. 1, 2016), http://www.lawyersforbritain.org/files/
uk-right-to-negotiate-free-trade-agreements-before-leaving-eu.pdf.
17 R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5 (appeal taken from
Eng. & Wales); R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2016] EWHC 2768 (Admin)
(Q.B.) (Eng. & Wales).
14
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The President of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), Professor
Koen Lenaerts, predicts that there are myriad possible ways in which the
Brexit process could come before the EU Courts, 18 a view that has been
expressed by EU law experts. 19 The negotiations take place in the shadow of
these legal arguments and debates.
These legal debates have focused for the most part on questions arising
under either UK constitutional law or under EU law. What has been missing
from this debate are the possible questions that might arise under international
law. This short contribution explores some of the ways in which international
law issues arise through the Brexit process. Part I explores the “external”
dimension, that is, international law issues that arise concerning the UK’s
relationship with the rest of the world, especially international treaties entered
into by the EU and the UK. Part II focuses on the “internal” dimension,
examining how international law might play a role in disentangling the UK
from the EU legal order. Part III discusses the future agreements between the
UK and the EU, and how international law may provide some models for the
UK’s future relationship with the EU.
Brexit is a leap into the unknown. There are not many examples of States
leaving international organizations, let alone of a State withdrawing from such
a developed legal order as that of the EU. 20 The closest precedent of an entity
“withdrawing” from the European Community is the case of Greenland. 21 Yet
in that case, Greenland was not an EU Member State in its own right, so it was
not technically possible for it to withdraw. 22 Rather, Denmark sought to
modify the territorial application of substantial parts of the EU Treaties to
exclude EU law applying to Greenland. 23 Special arrangements, such as those
regarding fisheries and trade, were developed, and the EU Member States and

18 Duncan Robinson & Alex Barker, ‘Many Ways’ Brexit May Go to EU Courts, Top ECJ Judge Says,’
FIN. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/6609025a-adbc-11e6-ba7d-76378e4fef24.
19 Steve Peers, Brexit: Can the ECJ Get Involved?, EU L. ANALYSIS (Nov. 3, 2016), http://
eulawanalysis.blogspot.dk/2016/11/brexit-can-ecj-get-involved.html.
20 See Ramses A. Wessel, You Can Check Out Any Time You Like, But Can You Really Leave? On
‘Brexit’ And Leaving International Organizations, 13 IOLR 2 (2016).
21 See Henry Bodkin, Greenland Showed How to Leave Europe as Far Back as 1984, TELEGRAPH (June
24, 2016), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/24/greenland-showed-how-to-leave-europe-as-far-backas-1984/.
22 Maia De La Baume, Greenland’s Exit Warning to Britain, POLITICO (June 24, 2016), http://www.
politico.eu/article/greenland-exit-warning-to-britain-brexit-eu-referendum-europe-vote-news-denmark/.
23 Id.
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institutions were consulted at each stage. 24 Compared with the example of
Greenland, the withdrawal of the UK is magnified in complexity. It will not be
simply withdrawing from an international agreement; it will be extricating
itself from a complex legal system that over the years has become closely
entwined with UK domestic law. 25 Moreover, for decades the EU has been
active on the international plane, entering into agreements in fields such as
trade, fisheries, and so on. As the UK seeks to disentangle itself from these
complex legal relationships, international law plays a role at each level.
I. THE EXTERNAL DIMENSION: THE UK AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
The legal debate since the Brexit referendum has focused on two main
questions. The first set of legal questions relates to the Brexit process and the
triggering of Article 50 TEU. This involves constitutional questions about who
may give notice to withdrawal, or whether such notice may be revoked once
given. 26 The second set of legal questions relates to the type of relationship the
United Kingdom might have upon withdrawal, and what kinds of structures
and relationships may be put in place. 27 In these legal debates, EU law and UK
constitutional law take center stage. Yet, another set of legal questions also
arises regarding the relationships that the EU and the UK have with other
States and international organizations, and the legal consequences that flow
from the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. The UK’s withdrawal will have major
consequences at the international level, especially for the hundreds of
international treaties that have been concluded by the EU and the UK with
non-EU Member States (so-called “third States”) and international
organizations. The EU and the UK will face an important question: what will
happen to the many international treaties to which the EU and the UK are

24

Fisheries Partnership Agreement Between the European Community on the one hand, and the
Government of Denmark and the Home Rule Government of Greenland, on the other hand, EU-Green., June
30, 2007, 2007 O.J. (L 172) 4; see What is Greenland’s Relationship with the EU, EU INFO. CTR. http://
english.eu.dk/en/faq/faq/Greenland (last visited Apr. 1, 2017).
25 See Mark Elliot, The Supreme Court Judgment in Miller, PUBLIC L. FOR EVERYONE (Jan. 25, 2017),
https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2017/01/25/analysis-the-supreme-courts-judgment-in-miller/. The discussion about
how UK law and EU law are entwined played out in the Miller litigation, discussed in Part II. A. infra.
26 See Patrick Wintour, UK Must Remain Under EU Law During Brexit Transition, Diplomats Say,
GUARDIAN (Feb. 3, 2017, 8:57 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/feb/03/brexit-transition-ukeu-law; See also RICHARD GORDON & ROWENA MOFFATT, CONSTITUTION SOC’Y, BREXIT: THE IMMEDIATE
LEGAL CONSEQUENCES (2016), https://www.consoc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Brexit-PDF.pdf.
27 See Thomas Brown & Eren Waitzman, Leaving the European Union: Future UK-EU Relationship,
HOUSE OF LORDS LIBRARY (Nov. 25, 2016), http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/
Summary/LLN-2016-0063.
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parties? Will they continue to apply to the UK as a non-EU Member State?
The EU is generally a party to two main types of agreements. The first are
those to which the EU is a party, but not the EU Member States (“EU-only
agreements”). 28 The second type are those agreements that include both the EU
and the EU Member States, usually because the agreement touches upon the
competences of both the EU and the EU Member States (“mixed
agreements”). 29 These will be discussed in turn.
A. EU-only Agreements
EU Member States are bound by “EU-only agreements” by virtue of EU
law, specifically Art. 216(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU). 30 The EU concludes these agreements in its own right, without
the participation of the EU Member States. 31 This is the case, for instance, with
agreements in the field of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP) or where the EU has exclusive competence, such as agreements in the
field of maritime resources. 32 Upon the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, these
EU-only agreements will no longer apply with respect to the UK. 33 This is
because such agreements usually stipulate that they apply to territories in
which EU law is applied. Therefore, since EU law will no longer apply with
respect to the UK territory upon its withdrawal, such agreements would no
longer be binding upon the UK from the date of withdrawal. 34 The EU is

28 Ramses A Wessel, The EU as a Party to International Agreements: Shared Competences, Mixed
Responsibilities, in LAW AND PRACTICE OF EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS: SALIENT FEATURES OF A CHANGING
LANDSCAPE 159 (Alan Dashwood & Marc Maresceau eds.).
29 See PIET EECKHOUT, EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS LAW 212–20 (2011). See HOUSE OF COMMONS
LIBRARY, EU EXTERNAL AGREEMENTS: EU AND UK PROCEDURES (Mar. 29, 2016), http://researchbriefings.
parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7192.
30 TFEU, supra note 16, art. 216(2).
31 Wessel, supra note 28, at 159.
32 Id.
33 Guillaume Van der Loo & Steven Blockmans, The Impact of Brexit on the EU’s International
Agreements, CTR. FOR EUR. POL’Y STUD. (July 15, 2016), https://www.ceps.eu/publications/impact-brexiteu’s-international-agreements.
34 For example, Article 15(15) of the Free Trade Agreement between the EU and the Republic of Korea
sets out the territorial application of the treaty:

This Agreement shall apply, on the one hand, to the territories in which the Treaty on European
Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union are applied and under the
conditions laid down in those Treaties, and, on the other hand, to the territory of Korea.
References to ‘territory’ in this Agreement shall be understood in this sense, unless explicitly
stated otherwise.
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arguably obliged, however, to communicate to its treaty partners that the EU
consists of twenty-seven Member States. 35 Since the EU informs treaty
partners when new States have joined the EU, and in some cases adopts
protocols to include acceding Members to existing agreements, 36 the EU would
similarly be required to inform third States of an EU Member State leaving.
Van der Loo and Blockmans also point out that the EU’s treaty partners “may
feel cheated at the sudden loss of access to a sizeable chunk of the Single
Market (64 million fewer consumers) and the cost and time of having to
renegotiate a bilateral agreement with the UK.” 37 The departure of such a large
and economically important country from the EU will have an impact on those
third countries, who might seek to either renegotiate or even withdraw from the
agreement with the EU. For those agreements that contain a specific
termination or denunciation clause, one party may terminate the agreement by
giving the required notice as set out in the clause. For agreements that do not
explicitly include such a termination or denunciation clause, such a process
would be governed by the principles set out in the 1969 Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties (VCLT), in particular Article 56. 38
One could make the argument, however, that the UK continues to be bound
by the obligations under such EU-only agreements by way of succession.
According to this argument, the EU entered into these agreements “on behalf
of” its Member States, 39 and the international obligations would flow back to
the withdrawing Member State upon leaving. The CJEU has held that, under
certain circumstances, the EU may be bound by the legal international
obligations of the EU Member States by way of succession, where they are all

Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic
of Korea, of the other part art. 15(15), May 14, 2011, O.J. (L 127) 1.
35 Van der Loo & Blockmans, supra note 33.
36 See, e.g., Protocol to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement establishing a partnership between
the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Russian Federation, of the other
part, to take account of the accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus,
the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the
Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia, and the Slovak Republic to the European Union, 2006, O.J. (L
185) 17.
37 Van der Loo & Blockmans, supra note 33.
38 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 56, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into
force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter VCLT].
39 See Adam Łazowski & Ramses A. Wessel, The External Dimension of Withdrawal from the European
Union, REVUE DES AFFAIRES EUROPÉENNES (forthcoming 2017) (https://www.utwente.nl/en/bms/pa/research/
wessel/wessel122.pdf).
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a party to an international agreement. 40 However, there is no indication
whether the opposite is the case, that is, that when competences are handed
back to a Member State, that state would be bound by commitments entered
into by the EU. Bartels makes such an argument with regard to the World
Trade Organization’s (WTO) 2014 Government Procurement Agreement
(GPA 2014), which is a plurilateral WTO agreement to which the EU is a
party, but the UK is not. Bartels submits that “on leaving the EU, the UK will
succeed to the GPA in its own right, in accordance with rules of customary
international law on the succession of States to treaties, and practice under the
GATT 1947, which ‘guides’ the WTO.”41 There are two main arguments put
forward in support of this. The first is based on the practice of the dissolution
of unions and federations. In these cases, Bartels argues, the entity gaining
autonomy succeeded to the rights and obligations of treaties entered into by the
federation or union. 42 The second argument is that the EU entered into the
GPA 2014 “on behalf of” its Member States, and that this was accepted by the
other parties to the agreement. 43
Łazowski and Wessel argue that there are some “serious flaws” with the
succession argument. 44 The first is that EU-only agreements do not include the
UK as a contracting party. 45 Second, these agreements are often structured in a
bilateral way, or include commitments that can only be effectively exercised
within the EU framework, and it might prove difficult or impossible to apply
these agreements to the UK. 46 The third issue is that automatic succession
denies the EU’s personality as a separate and distinct legal entity in
international law. 47 Given the EU’s status as an autonomous actor in
international law, they argue, “it is difficult to hold on to the idea that the EU
acted on behalf of its Member States.” 48

40

See Joined Cases 21 & 24/72, Int’l Fruit Co. & Others v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit, 1972
E.C.R. 1219, ¶ 18 (“ … in so far as under the EEC Treaty the Community has assumed the powers previously
exercised by Member States in the area governed by the General Agreement, the provisions of that agreement
have the effect of binding the Community.”).
41 Lorand Bartels, The UK’s Status in the WTO After Brexit, in THE UNITED KINGDOM: ‘FEDERALISM’
WITHIN AND WITHOUT (Robert Schütze & Stephen Tierney eds., forthcoming 2017) (available at https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2841747).
42 Id. at 19.
43 Id.
44 Łazowski & Wessel, supra note 39, at 13.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
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International law regarding the succession of treaties gives no clear
guidance. The Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of
Treaties, for example, applies only “to the effects of a succession of States in
respect of treaties between States.” 49 It is questionable whether these rules can
be applied by analogy to the context of a state leaving a regional organization.
The examples discussed by Bartels pertain mostly to unions of states and
federations—it is equally unclear whether these examples are appropriate to
the Brexit context. In his report on succession in respect of treaties, Sir
Humphrey Waldock cautioned against treating economic organizations as
unions of states: “there are some hybrid unions which may appear to have
some analogy with a union of States but which do not, in the opinion of the
Special Rapporteur, form part of the present topic … One such hybrid is EEC
[European Economic Community].” 50 For the purposes of succession, it was
argued the EEC was to be dealt with as an intergovernmental organization.
Autonomic succession arguably has the benefit of allowing greater
continuity in treaty relations. However, it may not always be possible to
continue to apply certain agreements with respect to the UK as a non-EU
member. The question of whether a leaving state will succeed to treaty
obligations does not have a clear answer, and will depend on specific
circumstances, and the type of agreement in question. Moreover, the fate of
EU-only agreements with respect to the UK could be dealt with in part through
the exit agreement that will be negotiated between the EU and the UK, which
will be discussed in Part III, infra.
B. Mixed Agreements
Different questions arise in relation to mixed agreements. Prima facie,
where the United Kingdom is a party to such mixed agreements (alongside the
EU), the UK would continue to be bound by such an agreement under
international law. 51 However, one problem is that such mixed agreements are
often structured in a way so that the EU Member States and the EU are parties
together, with the EU responsible for obligations touching upon its fields of
competence, and the EU Member States responsible for implementing the
agreement in their fields of competence. These agreements do not specify with
49 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties art. 1, Aug. 23, 1978, 1946
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Nov. 6, 1996).
50 Sir Humphrey Waldock, Special Rapporteur, Fifth Report on Succession in Respect of Treaties, [1972]
2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 18, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1972/Add.1.
51 Van der Loo & Blockmans, supra note 33.
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any degree of certainty who is responsible for which fields. While the EU is
often under an obligation to render a “declaration of competences,” which sets
out who is responsible for implementing different parts of the treaty, in
practice such declarations are worded in a vague manner giving little practical
guidance. 52 Another problem is that many mixed agreements are structured in
a bilateral manner, with the EU and its Member States on one side of the
agreement, and the other State or group of States on the other. 53 The Cotonou
Agreement, which involves the EU and the Member States as well as seventynine countries from Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific, is structured as a
bilateral treaty. 54 This means the two sides of the agreement have legal
obligations towards the other, as opposed to there being a set of mutual
obligations owed among the parties.
The continued application of agreements to the UK may depend on how
“party” is defined in an agreement. 55 In some cases, an agreement will apply to
the EU and its Member States. 56 In other instances, the UK is named as a party
in its own right. In the latter case, the UK would remain a party to the
agreement, but the EU and UK will likely have to inform treaty partners about
the change in status. 57 For instance, the EU and the UK are both members of
the WTO, and will continue to be WTO members after Brexit. 58 There is sharp
disagreement, however, about what consequences this will have for the UK.
For years, the EU has exercised powers and rights on behalf of the EU Member
States. Questions arise regarding whether and to what extent the UK will have
to renegotiate the terms of its future WTO membership outside the EU. 59
52 See Andres Delgado Casteleiro, EU Declarations of Competence to Multilateral Agreements: A Useful
Reference Base?, 17 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 491–509 (2012).
53 See Van der Loo & Blockmans, supra note 33 (citing Case C-316/91, European Parliament v. Council,
1994 E.C.R. 1-625, ¶ 29).
54 See generally Cotonou Partnership Agreement Between the Members of the African, Caribbean and
Pacific Group of States, of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part,
June 23, 2000, 2000 O.J. (L 317) 3.
55 Thanks to Tim Corthaut for drawing my attention to this point.
56 See, e.g., Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and
Colombia and Peru, of the other part, June 26, 2012, 2006 O.J. (L 354) 3.
57 Łazowski & Wessel, supra note 39, at 15.
58 SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, THE PROCESS FOR WITHDRAWING
FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION, 2016, Cm. 9216, at 15 (UK), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/504216/The_process_for_withdrawing_from_the_EU_print_ready.pdf.
59 Peter Ungphakorn, Nothing Simple About UK Regaining WTO Status Post-Brexit, INT’L CTR. FOR
TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV. (June 27, 2016), http://www.ictsd.org/opinion/nothing-simple-about-ukregaining-wto-status-post-brexit. See Bartels, supra note 41. Bartels argues that “the UK already today
possesses full WTO rights and obligations under the WTO multilateral trade agreements, even if these are, at
present, for the most part, exercised and performed on its behalf by the EU.” Id.
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For these and other issues, international law does not provide clear
solutions. Some of these questions, such as the fate of agreements, could be
dealt with in the withdrawal agreement negotiated between the UK and the EU
(see Part III infra). The European Council’s Draft Guidelines, for instance,
seem to accept that after withdrawal, the UK will no longer be covered, not
only by EU-only agreements, but mixed agreements as well: “The United
Kingdom will no longer be covered by agreements concluded by the Union or
by Member States acting on its behalf or by both acting jointly.” 60 However,
the Guidelines also set out that “[t]he European Council expects the United
Kingdom to honour its share of international commitments contracted in the
context of its EU membership. In such instances, a constructive dialogue with
the United Kingdom on a possible common approach towards third country
partners and international organisations concerned should be engaged.” 61 The
parties may decide, for instance, that certain agreements will continue to apply
with respect to the UK for a specific transitional period while the UK
negotiates and concludes new agreements. However, any withdrawal
agreement dealing with these issues would not be capable of affecting the
rights of third parties. 62 The principle of pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt
(“a treaty binds the parties and only the parties; it does not create obligations
for a third state”) enshrined in Article 34 of the VCLT 63 is a principle of
customary international law binding on the EU and the UK. 64
The fate of these international agreements after Brexit is not clear-cut. One
should bear in mind that Brexit not only affects the UK and the EU, but will
also have important consequences for the many other States with whom they
have entered into international agreements.
II. THE INTERNAL DIMENSION: INVOKING ARTICLE 50 TEU
Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union provides the legal avenue for
an EU Member State to withdraw from the EU. 65 This provision did not create
such a right—a Member State possessed an inherent right to leave the

60
61
62
63
64
65

European Council Draft Guidelines, supra note 12, at para. 13.
Id.
Van der Loo & Blockmans, supra note 33.
VCLT, supra note 38, art. 34.
C-386/08, Brita v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg Hafen, 2010 E.C.R. 1-1289, ¶¶ 40–45.
TEU, supra note 14, art. 50.

ODERMATT GALLEYFINAL

1062

4/13/2017 12:20 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31

European Union prior to the inclusion of Article 50 in the EU Treaties 66—
rather, it provided a legal mechanism and process by which this right is to be
exercised. The VCLT establishes that a party may withdraw from a treaty “in
conformity with the provisions of the treaty.” 67 While Article 50 TEU is the
starting point for exiting the European Union, it has been debated whether it is
the only legal avenue. Some argued that the UK might be able to “bypass”
Article 50 TEU using international law, for instance, by invoking the Brexit
vote as a “fundamental change in circumstances” according to Article 62(1)(a)
VCLT. 68 Such proposals were not serious. This article of the VCLT was
deliberately worded negatively, stating that a fundamental change in
circumstances cannot be invoked unless two highly restrictive conditions are
fulfilled. 69 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has also pointed out “the
stability of treaty relations requires that the plea of fundamental change of
circumstances be applied only in exceptional cases.” 70 It is unlikely that the
CJEU would allow international law to be used in this manner, especially when
Article 50 TEU provides a clear avenue for withdrawing from the EU
Treaties. 71 An argument can be made that Article 50 TEU was intended to
provide the only avenue for withdrawal from the EU; therefore Article 50 TEU
displaces other methods of withdrawal from a treaty that exist under
international law.
The UK has now given notice of its intention to withdraw, according to
Article 50(2) TEU. 72 The question remains whether this provision provides the
complete and exhaustive set of rules that apply to the withdrawal process.
Article 50 TEU is silent on a number of important issues that will face the UK,

66 EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, THE PROCESS OF WITHDRAWING FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION, 2015-6,
HL135, ¶7 (UK).
67 VCLT, supra note 38, art. 54(a).
68 See Frank Vibert & Gunnar Beck, The Seven Days of Brexit: How a Leave Government Could Bypass
Article 50, LSE BREXIT BLOG (June 15, 2016), http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2016/06/15/the-seven-days-ofbrexit-how-a-leave-government-could-bypass-article-50/.
69 These conditions are “(a) The existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the
consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and (b) The effect of the change is radically to transform the
extent of obligations still to be performed under the treaty.” VCLT, supra note 38, art. 62(1).
70 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep 7 ¶ 104 (Sept. 25).
71 As Professor Kenneth Armstrong argues, “there is simply no way that the European Court of Justice
would permit the autonomous legal order of the European Union and the specific procedural mechanism of
Article 50 TEU to bend to international law in this manner.” Kenneth Armstrong, The Vote Leave Framework
for a New UK-EU Deal: Analysis (Ctr. for European Legal Studies Working Paper No. 3, 2016),
http://resources.law.cam.ac.uk/cels/working_papers/CELS_Analysis_the_Leave_Roadmap.pdf.
72 European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act, (2017) http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2017/
9/pdfs/ukpga_20170009_en.pdf.
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the EU, and international partners. To what extent can rules of international
law or EU law come in to fill these gaps? For instance, international law
arguments may be invoked to answer one of the most debated questions
regarding Article 50 TEU: can notification be revoked once given?
A. Revocability of Article 50 TEU Notification: Dodging a Bullet
In R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (Miller),
(discussed in more detail in Part II.B. infra) the UK Supreme Court did not
examine the question of whether Article 50 notification could be revoked. 73
The parties in the case agreed that notification could not be revoked, and the
Court found that it was not necessary to examine that issue. 74 One might argue
that the Court was reluctant to examine this delicate question, in part, because
it would have involved the Court interpreting the EU Treaties, meaning that it
would arguably have had to refer the question to the CJEU. 75 On this issue, it
was in both parties’ interest to argue that notification could not be revoked. For
the applicants, the effects of invoking Article 50 TEU were all the more drastic
if notification is irreversible. The Government was also adamant—perhaps as
much for political as legal reasons—that Article 50 notice is a step that cannot
be taken back. 76 The question of whether the Government might be capable of
“reversing” its Article 50 notification remains an important one. 77 This could

73 See R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5 (appeal taken
from Eng. & Wales).
74 Id. at [26].

[I]t is common ground that notice under article 50(2) . . . cannot be given in qualified or
conditional terms and that, once given, it cannot be withdrawn. Especially as it is the Secretary of
State’s case that, even if this common ground is mistaken, it would make no difference to the
outcome of these proceedings, we are content to proceed on the basis that that is correct, without
expressing any view of our own on either point.
Id.
75 The preliminary reference procedure is established by Article 267 TFEU. TFEU, supra note 16, art.
267. Experts disagree on whether the UK Courts were under an obligation to refer the question regarding
Article 50 TEU to the CJEU. See VAUGHNE MILLER, ARABELLA LANG & JACK SIMSON-CAIRD, HOUSE OF
COMMONS LIBRARY, BRIEFING PAPER NO. 7763, BREXIT: ARTICLE 50 TEU AND THE EU COURT 8–9 (Nov. 14,
2016).
76 R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, [26] (appeal taken
from Eng. & Wales).
77 Jake Rylatt, The Irrevocability of an Article 50 Notification: Lex Specialis and the Irrelevance of the
Purported Customary Right to Unilaterally Revoke, UK CONST. L. BLOG (July 27, 2016), https://
ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/07/27/jake-rylatt-the-irrevocability-of-an-article-50-notification-lex-specialisand-the-irrelevance-of-the-purported-customary-right-to-unilaterally-revoke/; Charles Streeten, Putting the
Toothpaste Back in the Tube: Can an Article 50 Notification Be Revoked?, UK CONST. L. BLOG (July 13,
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occur, for instance, if a new Government were to win an election on the
platform of remaining within the EU, and then sought to revoke the UK’s
Article 50 notification. There are also some fears that the UK could “abuse”
the right to withdrawal notification in order to extend the two-year negotiation
period. 78 Many have argued that once invoked, Article 50 notification cannot
be revoked. 79 But is this really the case?
The applicants in Miller invoked the metaphor of Article 50 notification
being like pulling the trigger of a gun—by giving notice under Article 50 the
UK will be “pulling . . . the trigger which causes the bullet to be fired, with the
consequence that the bullet will hit the target and the Treaties will cease to
apply.” 80 Three main arguments were put forward to support this argument:
Article 50 is deliberately designed to avoid any such consequence.
There is no mention of a power to withdraw. And the very possibility
of a power to withdraw a notification would frustrate, again, Article
50(3), which sets out in the clearest possible terms, what the
consequences are of giving the notification under Article 50(2). 81

2016),
https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/07/13/charles-streeten-putting-the-toothpaste-back-in-the-tubecan-an-article-50-notification-be-revoked.
78 Daniel Boffey, Barnier ‘Lobbied to Stop May Withdrawing Article 50 in Two Years,’ GUARDIAN (Apr.
7, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/apr/07/michel-barnier-eu-red-line-theresa-may-article50-brussels. A European Parliament resolution has stressed that the withdrawal process could only be stopped
with the consent of the other twenty-seven Member States.
79 Eva-Maria Poptcheva, Article 50 TEU: Withdrawal of a Member State from the EU, EUR.
PARLIAMENT RES. SERV. (Feb. 2016), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/577971/
EPRS_BRI(2016)577971_EN.pdf.
Most commentators argue that [unilateral revocation] is impossible or at least doubtful, from a
legal point of view. Indeed Article 50 TEU does not expressly provide for the revocation of a
notice of withdrawal and establishes that, once opened, the withdrawal process ends either within
two years or later, if this deadline is extended by agreement.
Id. This analysis does not rule out the possibility of suspending withdrawal, with the agreement of the EU
Member States and institutions. See Nick Barber, Tom Hickman & Jeff King, Pulling the Article 50 ‘Trigger’:
Parliament’s Indispensable Role, UK CONST. L. BLOG (June 27, 2016), https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/
2016/06/27/nick-barber-tom-hickman-and-jeff-king-pulling-the-article-50-trigger-parliaments-indispensablerole/. “The first point to note about Article 50 is that it is a once-and-for-all decision; there is no turning back
once Article 50 has been invoked.” Id.
80 R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, [36] (appeal taken
from Eng. & Wales) (quoting Lord Pannick QC). Lord Carnwath criticizes this metaphor as “superficially
attractive, but (with respect) fallacious.” Id. at [262].
81 Santos and M -v- Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union: Transcripts, COURTS &
TRIBUNALS JUDICIARY, https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/20161013-all-day.pdf (last
visited Apr. 1, 2017) (follow “Full Day Transcript for 13 October 2016” hyperlink).
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These arguments are based on a similar premise: that Article 50 provides the
complete picture about withdrawal. It was argued that since there is no explicit
mention of the ability of an EU Member State to revoke its Article 50
notification, this is not allowed under the EU Treaties. 82 While the EU Treaties
are silent on the question of whether Article 50 notification can be revoked,
one may find guidance from international law, notably Articles 65–68 of the
VCLT. 83 Article 65 provides a procedure with respect to invalidity,
termination, withdrawal from or suspension of the operation of a treaty, and
Article 68 sets out that “a notification or instrument provided for in article 65
or 67 may be revoked at any time before it takes effect.” 84 If one assumes that
Article 68 VCLT represents customary international law (which is not entirely
clear), then it would seem that a party has the right to revoke unilaterally its
notification to withdraw from the EU Treaties. 85 The UK would therefore have
the right to withdraw its notice at any point up until withdrawal takes effect. 86
This argument is based on the premise that the law of treaties, particularly
Article 68 VCLT, actually applies to the Article 50 TEU process. 87 If one
views the EU legal order as a “self-contained regime,” 88 the EU Treaties
provide for a complete system and remedies. 89 As long as the EU Treaties
themselves provide for a complete set of rules, recourse should not be made to
rules of general international law, including the customary law of treaties. In
this case, it could be argued, Article 50 sets out the entire procedure that
should take place in the event that a Member State chooses to leave the EU. 90
82

SELECT COMMITTEE

ON THE

CONSTITUTION, THE INVOKING

OF

ARTICLE 50, 2016–7, HL44, ¶ 11–12

(UK).
83

Rylatt, supra note 77.
VCLT, supra note 38, art. 68.
85 Rylatt supra note 77.
86 EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, supra note 66.
87 Rylatt supra note 77.
88 See Bruno Simma & Dirk Pulkowski, Of Planets and the Universe: Self-contained Regimes in
International Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 483 (2006).
89 In Commission v. Luxembourg & Belgium the Court held that:
84

[T]he Treaty is not limited to creating reciprocal obligations between the different natural and
legal persons to whom it is applicable, but establishes a new legal order which governs the
powers, rights and obligations of the said persons, as well as the necessary procedures for taking
cognizance of and penalizing any breach of it. Therefore, except where otherwise expressly
provided, the basic concept of the Treaty requires that the Member States shall not take the law
into their own hands.
Joined Cases 90/63 and 91/63, Commission v. Lux. & Belg., 1964 E.C.R. 01217. See Eckhart Klein, SelfContained Regime, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006).
90 Steve Peers, Article 50 TEU: The Uses and Abuses of the Process of Withdrawing from the EU, EU L.
ANALYSIS (Dec. 8, 2014), http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.dk/2014/12/article-50-teu-uses-and-abuses-of.html.
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Whereas the right to revoke a notification of withdrawal under Article 68
VCLT may make sense for a “normal” treaty, one could argue that Article 50
introduces a specific set of rules that were designed for the situation of a
Member State leaving the EU, displacing the application of general
international law through the rule of lex specialis. One could make the case
that specific rules of withdrawal were necessary in the EU context, especially
given the drastic effects that such a move would have, not only for the
withdrawing Member State, but also for the other members of the Union.
Although the UK Supreme Court dodged this bullet, the question of
revoking Article 50 notice remains an unsettled and important question.
Litigation has been brought before the High Court in Ireland on this issue, in
which litigants are hoping that Irish Courts will refer the question to the CJEU
in Luxembourg. 91
B. Miller: International and European Law Issues
The UK Government initially decided to invoke Article 50 TEU via royal
prerogative, instead of involving the British Parliament. 92 This gave rise to
litigation before the High Court of England and Wales brought by applicants
who argued that Article 50 TEU could only be invoked with the consent of the
Parliament. 93 On November 3, 2016, the High Court held in R (Miller) v.
Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, that the British Government
did not have the power to give notification under Article 50 to withdraw from
the EU without involving Parliament. 94 If this were not the case, the Court
held, the Crown would be able to make drastic changes to domestic law and
affect citizen’s rights through an action on the international plane. 95 The
Government appealed this decision to the Supreme Court, which delivered its

91 Dennis Staunton, Dublin High Court Case to Establish if Britain Can Halt Brexit, IRISH TIMES
(Jan. 26, 2017), http://www.irishtimes.com/news/crime-and-law/courts/high-court/dublin-high-court-case-toestablish-if-britain-can-halt-brexit-1.2952654.
92 Gavin Barrett, Tackling Brexit in the Irish Courts is a Long Shot. But Sometimes Long Shots Work,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jan/26/tackling-brexit-irishcourt-long-shot-article-50; Owen Bowcott, Royal Prerogative Takes Centre Stage as Supreme Court Brexit
Case Opens, GUARDIAN (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/dec/05/supreme-courtbrexit-case-whose-prerogative-is-it-anyway.
93 R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5 (appeal taken from
Eng. & Wales).
94 R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2016] EWHC 2768 (Admin) (Q.B.),
[94] (Eng. & Wales).
95 Id. at [69].
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judgment on January 24, 2017. 96 By an 8–3 majority, the Court upheld the
decision of the Divisional Court. 97 On a separate issue, it held 11–0 that
permission of the devolved nations within the United Kingdom was not
needed. 98
The legal questions in Miller were ostensibly only about British
constitutional law; they did not relate to the interpretation of EU or
international law. Rather, the legal questions focused on the inherent powers of
the executive (the “royal prerogative”) to act on the international plane.
Ordinarily, the royal prerogative includes the power to negotiate and ratify
international agreements, as well as the power to withdraw from a treaty. 99
Given the UK’s dualist system, however, such action on the international plane
can only have domestic effect through legislation passed by Parliament. 100
Moreover, the royal prerogative may not be used in a way that removes rights
upon individuals. 101
The UK Government argued that there is no constitutional requirement to
involve Parliament, since invoking Article 50 TEU is a step to withdraw from
a treaty, one that is ordinarily done through royal prerogative. 102 It argued
before the High Court that “[s]uch a notification [under Article 50 TEU] would
be an administrative act on the international law plane . . . .” 103 However, the
High Court found that withdrawal from the EU would not only produce effects
on the plane of international law, as is the case with other treaties, but would
have the effect of modifying domestic law, in particular by interfering with the
rights of individuals. 104 The Supreme Court also accepted this reasoning. 105

96

R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5.
Id. at [74]–[93].
98 Id. at [126]–[135].
99 LUCINDA MAER & OONAGH GAY, PARLIAMENT & CONSTITUTION CTR., THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE,
SN/PC/03861 (Dec. 30, 2009), http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN03861.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, [5] (appeal taken
from Eng. & Wales).
103 Detailed Grounds of Resistance on Behalf of the Secretary of State at [5], R (Miller) v. Secretary of
State for Exiting the European Union, [2016] EWHC 2768 (Admin) (Q.B.) (Sept. 2, 2016).
104 R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2016] EWHC 2768 (Admin) (Q.B.),
[96] (Eng. & Wales). “[T]he Crown cannot through the exercise of its prerogative powers alter the domestic
law of the United Kingdom and modify rights acquired in domestic law under the ECA 1972 or the other legal
effects of that Act.” Id.
105 R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, [69].
97
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The Supreme Court further noted the unique nature of the EU Treaties and
the way in which EU law is given effect in the UK legal order. EU law is a
“dynamic, international source of law”:
The EU Treaties as implemented pursuant to the 1972 [European
Communities] Act were and are unique in their legislative and
constitutional implications. In 1972, for the first time in the history of
the United Kingdom, a dynamic, international source of law was
grafted onto, and above, the well-established existing sources of
domestic law: Parliament and the courts. 106

One of the main findings of the Supreme Court in this regard was that EU law
is a “source of UK law.” 107 The Court acknowledged that there are many
statutes that give effect to treaties in domestic law; however, the European
Communities Act 1972 (ECA 1972) goes much further: “It authorises a
dynamic process by which, without further primary legislation (and, in some
cases, even without any domestic legislation), EU law not only becomes a
source of UK law, but actually takes precedence over all domestic sources of
UK law, including statutes.” 108 EU law is an “independent and overriding
source of domestic law” 109 and the ECA 1972 acts as a “conduit pipe” 110
linking EU law and UK domestic law. The Court therefore accepted the special
nature of EU law within the UK legal system. This reflects the notion,
developed by the CJEU in van Gend en Loos, that EU law is a “new legal
order.” 111 Given this nature of EU law as an independent source of law, the
Government could not, using unilateral action under its prerogative “turn off”
these effects of EU law. The Court acknowledged that in normal circumstances
the withdrawal from a treaty on behalf of the UK would be a matter for the
Crown. 112 However, the EU Treaties have transformed from international

Although article 50 operates on the plane of international law, it is common ground that, because
the EU Treaties apply as part of UK law, our domestic law will change as a result of the United
Kingdom ceasing to be party to them, and rights enjoyed by UK residents granted through EU
law will be affected.
Id.
106

R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, [90].
Id. [60].
108 Id.
109 Id. [65].
110 Id.
111 Case C-26/62, N.V. Algemene Transport en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse
Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1, Judgment, 3.
112 R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, [5] (appeal taken
from Eng. & Wales).
107
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treaties that have effect between States, to the constitutional foundations of a
legal order, which, among other things, confers rights on individuals that can
be guaranteed in other EU Member States.
The judgment and legal discussion surrounding Miller therefore highlights
the diverging views about the nature of the EU and EU law. Are the EU
Treaties a form of “ordinary” international law, which is then given effect
through the ECA 1972? This was the starting point of the Government’s
arguments, as well as the dissenting opinions in Miller. 113 Or are they, as the
majority held in Miller, 114 an independent source of law? The constitutional
question about the exercise of prerogative powers turns on this more
fundamental question. Moreover, Miller will not be the last of these types of
cases. 115 There will likely be many more cases involving Brexit issues before
courts in the UK, other EU Member States, the CJEU, as well as before
international dispute settlement mechanisms. The legal outcome of these
disputes may depend on what conception of the EU and EU law one accepts.
As Elliott argues, Miller demonstrates “fundamentally different views about
the constitutional status that EU law has (and will, until Brexit, continue to
have) within the UK’s legal system.” 116 Are the EU Treaties to be dealt with in
the same way as other “ordinary” international instruments, or are they to be
treated as the foundations of different type of constitutional legal order? 117

113 Id. [34], [159]. In his dissent, Lord Reed states that the ECA 1972 “simply creates a scheme under
which the effect given to EU law in domestic law reflects the UK’s international obligations under the
Treaties, whatever they may be.” Id. [187].
114 Id. [65].
115 For a discussion of some of these envisaged legal issues, see Phedon Nicolaides, Withdrawal from the
European Union: A Typology of Effects, 20 MAASTRICHT J. 209 (2013); Adam Łazowski, Withdrawal from the
European Union and Alternatives to Membership, 37 EUR. L. REV. 523, 530 (2012). Hannes Hofmeister,
Should I Stay or Should I Go?' – a Critical Analysis of the Right to Withdraw From the EU, 16 EUR. L.J. 589
(2010).
116 Mark Elliot, Analysis: The Supreme Court’s Judgment in Miller, PUBLIC L. FOR EVERYONE (Jan. 25,
2017), https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2017/01/25/analysis-the-supreme-courts-judgment-in-miller/.
117 See Piet Eeckhout & Eleni Frantziou, Brexit and Article 50 TEU: A Constitutionalist Reading 42 (Dec.
2016) (Univ. College London European Institute Working Paper), https://www.ucl.ac.uk/europeaninstitute/news/2016-17/working-paper-art50.

Article 50 raises important constitutional concerns not only for the withdrawing state - an issue
that thrives in the UK blogosphere - but also from the perspective of the EU and its identity as a
new legal order that creates rights and duties and safeguards them through accountable
institutions, rather than being merely an international treaty signed by states.
Id.
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III. THE FUTURE: THE WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT
A final issue relates to the agreements that will be concluded between the
UK and the EU (and its Member States). Under Article 50(2) TEU, the EU is
obligated to negotiate and conclude an agreement with the withdrawing State,
which sets out the arrangements for withdrawal “taking account of the
framework for its future relationship with the Union.” 118 This means that there
will likely be two international agreements. The first will deal with the
modalities for withdrawal (“withdrawal agreement”), whereas a second will set
out the future arrangements between the EU and the UK after the date of
withdrawal (“UK–EU relationship agreement”).
The withdrawal agreement will have to deal with the immediate issues that
arise from disentangling the UK from the EU legal system. These include the
rights of EU citizens in the UK and of UK citizens in the EU, the closure of
EU agencies in the UK, cross border security arrangements, and so on. 119 On
the EU side, the withdrawal agreement is to be negotiated according to Article
218(3) TFEU, which sets out the procedure for the EU to enter into treaties
with third countries and international organizations (although the UK will not
technically be a “third country” during the negotiations). 120 This also raises the
question of whether such an agreement is to be considered a form of EU
primary law (a “reverse accession treaty”) 121 or an international legal
instrument.
Such an agreement is to be concluded on behalf of the EU by the Council
acting by qualified majority. 122 Since the EU Member States will not be a party
to the withdrawal agreement, it will not require ratification by national
parliaments. 123 The European Parliament must also give its consent to such an
agreement. 124 As with any agreement concluded by the Union, the withdrawal
agreement must also be compatible with the EU Treaties and primary EU
118

TEU, supra note 14, art. 50(2).
See ROBYN MUNRO, INST. FOR GOV’T, BRIEFING PAPER: NEGOTIATING BREXIT (2016),
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/5040%20IFG%20-%20Negotiating
%20Brexit%20v4.pdf.
120 TFEU, supra note 16, art. 218(3).
121 Sarah Gordon, Untangling Britain from Europe Would Cause Constitutional ‘Havoc,’ FIN. TIMES
(June 20, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/d7ae7b70-361a-11e6-9a05-82a9b15a8ee7.
122 TEU, supra note 14, art. 50(2).
123 See MUNRO, supra note 119, at 5.
124 According to Article 50(2) TEU, the withdrawal agreement “shall be concluded on behalf of the Union
by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.” TEU,
supra note 14, art. 50(2).
119
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law. 125 While it is conceivable that the CJEU could be asked to give an opinion
pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU on whether such an agreement is compatible
with the EU Treaties, 126 given the tight time frame involved in negotiating and
securing the withdrawal agreement within two years, it is unlikely that the
CJEU would be asked to become involved. On the UK side, such a withdrawal
agreement would also be subject to its constitutional requirements, including
gaining the consent of the UK Parliament.
The UK–EU relationship agreement, on the other hand, will deal with the
relations between the UK, the EU, and its Member States following the UK’s
departure from the Union. 127 It is most likely that such an agreement will
include not only the UK and the EU, but also the remaining twenty-seven EU
Member States. 128 Although it would be technically possible for such an
agreement to fall within areas of exclusive EU competence, thereby excluding
the other twenty-seven Member States, in light of recent case law, this would
be a rather “bare bones” agreement. 129 Unlike the withdrawal agreement, the
UK–EU relationship agreement (assuming it is concluded as a mixed
agreement) would have to be ratified by the other twenty-seven EU Member
States. 130 Also unlike the withdrawal agreement, there is no timeframe
imposed on the UK–EU relationship agreement. 131
The UK has stated that it wants a “deep and special partnership” that would
involve economic and security cooperation. 132 It has stated its preference for
negotiating such an agreement alongside the withdrawal agreement, and is
confident that these can be negotiated and concluded within the two-year
period for withdrawal discussions. 133 The European Council, on the other
hand, has shown a preference for a two-step process: the first phase is to
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disentangle the UK from the EU and to deal with the immediate effects of
withdrawal; the second phase will focus on the future partnership, only once
the UK becomes a non-EU Member State. 134 Whereas the UK wants to
negotiate the two agreements together, the Draft Guidelines state that the EU
and the Member States will only be involved in “preliminary and preparatory
discussions” on the partnership agreement during the first phase. 135
While trade will be the main issue in any agreement on the future relations,
it may also include other issues, such as cooperation between the UK and EU
in areas like international security, or the UK’s involvement in certain EU
programs (e.g., in areas of scientific research). The UK government has stated
that it will not seek to replicate any existing “model,” such as those of Norway
or Switzerland, favoring a bespoke arrangement. 136 Such an agreement will be
in the form of a treaty between the EU and its Member States and the UK as a
“third country.”
The withdrawal agreement and the UK–EU relationship agreement cannot
possibly address all of the complex issues that will arise from the UK’s
departure from the EU. It will be necessary for these agreements to address
certain legal innovations, such as transitional arrangements or the
establishment of dispute settlement procedures. The UK Government’s White
Paper mentions the need for some type of dispute settlement mechanism to
exist post-Brexit, but does not offer any detail on what type of arrangement it
may seek. 137 The Draft Guidelines also state that the withdrawal agreement
should include dispute settlement mechanisms for the interpretation and
application of the withdrawal agreement. 138 In light of the CJEU’s case law on
international dispute mechanisms, which stress the need to preserve the
autonomy of EU law, 139 and the UK’s insistence that the CJEU will not have
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jurisdiction with regard to the UK post-Brexit, the design of such a dispute
settlement mechanism will be another sensitive legal issue. The negotiators
may find inspiration from the example of other international organizations and
international agreements in designing such arrangements. International law
could therefore provide the building blocks for these post-Brexit innovations.
CONCLUSION
The Brexit process involves the complicated disentangling of legal orders.
This not only includes the UK withdrawing from the EU legal order, which has
become closely entwined with UK law, but involves questions on the
international level, including the UK’s relationship with third States and
international organizations. While issues of UK law and EU law will be
predominant in the process, this contribution has shown how international law
issues come into play at every level. As the Miller case shows, some of these
issues touch upon more fundamental questions, such as the very nature of the
EU legal order. Whether such questions should be approached according to an
international law paradigm or using a constitutionalist approach remains to be
seen. The intense legal debate about Article 50 TEU foreshadows the types of
disputes that will continue to arise as the Brexit process unfolds. International
law will not just play a “gap-filling role,” however. Just as international law
initially provided the building blocks to establish the EU legal order,
international law will be used, perhaps in innovative ways, to establish the new
relationship between the UK and the EU.

